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LIABILITY INSURANCE-A MOVE TO LIMIT THE
EXCESS JUDGMENT DA3AGES AWARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whenever a liability insurer refuses to settle claims against his insured within
the applicable policy limits, the possibility of a cause of action for the failure to
settle1 between the insured 2 and the insurer arises. 3 In the typical situation, the
insured has been involved in an accident with a third party which results in
legal action. During the course of the litigation, the insurer refuses an opportunity to settle the injured third party's claim within the insured's policy limits.
As a result of the insurer's refusal to offer a settlement, the law suit continues
and, eventually, a recovery in excess of the insured's policy limits is awarded
to the injured third party. At this point, the insured has the right to bring an
action against the insurer for that portion of the judgment won by the third
party in excess of the monetary limits of the insurance policy. 4
This action by the insured commonly is referred to as an "excess judgment
suit." Although it has been the subject of numerous law review articles, the
majority of them focus on the existence of the insurer's liability3 rather than
on the quantity of damages recoverable in excess of the policy limits. This
1. The insured also may have a cause of action for the insurer's failure to defend claims
brought against the insured, or for the breach of other express covenants in the insurance
policy. The elements of such actions and the remedies available must be distinguished from
those available when the cause of action is for failure to settle or compromise claims. Specifically, when an insured sues for damages resulting from the insurer's failure to defend,
the maximum damages recoverable is limited to the face value of the policy. Similarly, a
breach of other express covenants of the insurance policy by the insurer normally cannot
result in damages of a greater value than the insurance coverage. See Comment, Insurance
-Insurer's Liability for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or Settle, 36 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rev. 304
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Insurer's Liability]; Comment, The Insurer's Duty To Defend
Under A Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 734 (1966); cf. Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d
533 (1970). See generally R. Keeton, Insurance Law (1971) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
2. The action also may be brought by a party suing in place of the insured. Any reference to the insured in this Note will encompass all possible representatives. See, e-g, Peterson v. Alicity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972) (assignee); Atlantic City v. American
Cas. Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1966) (third party beneficiary); Turgeon v. Shelby
Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 112 F. Supp. 355 (D. Conn. 1953) (subrogee).
3. See 7A J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §§ 4711-13 (1962) thereinafter cited
as Appleman]; Keeton, supra note 1, at 508-20. For a concise discussion of the problems
surrounding the duty of an insurer to settle claims see Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).
4. "[Tlhe more modem and better reasoned view is that the cause of action arises
when the insured incurs a binding judgment in excess of the policy limits." National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60, 66 (9th Cir. 1964); accord, Brown
v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
5. See, e.g, Comment, Excess Judgments and the Bad Faith Rule, 36 Albany L. Rev.
698 (1972); Note, Recent Developments in the Excess Judgment Suit, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev.
464 (1970); Insurer's Liability, supra note 1.
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Note, on the other hand, will emphasize primarily the quantity of damages currently recoverable, the factors which affect recovery, and the most recent trend
toward limiting the excess judgment damages award. As a preface to this analysis, the elements of insurer liability will be considered briefly.
II.

ELEMENTS OF INSURER LIABILITY

The courts have developed two tests to aid in determining when an insurer
will be liable in damages for refusing to settle claims against the insured. Depending on the jurisdiction involved, the excess judgment cause of action may
be considered either tortious or contractual, triggering either a "negligence" or
"bad faith" test of liability. 6
In a jurisdiction where liability is predicated on "bad faith" the court imposes upon the insurer the obligation7 to consider in good faith "the insured's
interests as well as its own when making decisions as to settlement." 8 Under
this test, if the insurer acted in bad faith in refusing a settlement it will be
liable. The vast majority of American jurisdictions follows this test.0
A minority of jurisdictions apply the "negligence test," thereby imposing the
following standard of care10 upon the insurer:
Under a liability policy in which the insurer assumes the duty of settling suits
against the insured, the obligation is one requiring due care and a strict performance
6. Keeton, supra note 1, at 510. See generally Note, Recent Developments in the Excess
Judgment Suit, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 464 (1970). At least one jurisdiction imposes strict
liability as well. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430-31, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967). See generally Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of
Insurer for Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 705 (1968); Comment, Insurer's Strict Liability for Entire Judgment, 13 S.D.L. Rev. 375 (1968).
7. Although numerous courts impose the good faith obligation, a recent Second Circuit
decision points out that "(wihile the New York rule is unquestionably that the insurer
must act in good faith, in the unending variety of fact patterns which continue to plague
courts . . . there is no pat formula which can be routinely applied to determine its presence." Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1972).
8. Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962); see Appleman, supra note 3, §§ 4711-13. Professor Keeton states that the "equality of interest" standard would be stated better in terms regarding the limit. "With respect to the decision
whether to settle or try the case, the insurance company must in good faith view the situation as it would if there were no policy limit applicable to the claim." Keeton, supra note
1, at 511; accord, Lange v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 290 Minn. 61, 65, 185 N.W.2d 881, 884
(1971).
9. Insurer's Liability, supra note 1, at 323-25 n.88.
10. Appleman, supra note 3, § 4713. "The standard of care is at least what a reasonable man would exercise in the management of his own affairs." Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 488, 56 A.2d 57, 60 (1947). The above standard is part
of the "Stowers Doctrine," established in G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1929).
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.. . and the insurer owes the duty to exercise reasonable care in conducting the
defense .... 1
The authorities are in conflict as to the merits of the two tests. It is felt that
the tests "are to some extent interchangeable"' 2 and that "virtually the -ame
evidence will be relied upon"' 3 under either test. In fact, many assert that the
final resolution of the liability issue "would not depend on the court's choice
between bad faith and negligence standards."' 4 More importantly, the court's
selection of either a bad faith or a negligence standard can indirectly affect the
damages recoverable by the insured, since the damages available in a tort action differ from those available in a contract actionrp
III.

THE DAMAGES AWARD

Assuming the insurer's liability, the key question is the "[ciontroversy over
remedies for breach of the company's duty regarding settlement."' Thus, the
question before the court and the plaintiff-insured is the amount of damages.
Since more often than not a third party plaintiff has substituted for the insured 7 damages outstanding from prior litigation'8 as well as any additional
damages and costs sought in the excess judgment suit itself must be determined.
A.

The General Rule

Most, if not all American jurisdictions agree that an insurer can be held
liable for the full amount of a judgment obtained against the insured in excess
of the applicable policy limits.' 9 Thus, the vast majority of cases result in
11. 14 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 51:5 (1965).
12. Appleman § 4712, at 562. Professor Appleman states, "it should be pointed out that
there is more of a difference in verbiage than there is in result ....
Some courts in weighing the responsibilities of the liability insurer, speak of bad faith; some speak of negligence,
others use the two terms interchangeably. And, in truth, they are to some extent interchangeable." Id. at 561-62. One writer has gone further and has concluded that the standard
upon which liability is ultimately based is "reasonable care." 30 Fordham L. Rev. 188, 193
(1961).
13. Keeton, supra note 1, at 510. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248
Md. 324, 328-32, 236 A.2d 269, 271-73 (1967). The court in White cited 7 Am. Jur. 2d
Automobile Insurance § 156 (1963), which states: "'And in a large number of the more
recent cases the two tests of "good faith" and "negligence" have tended to coalesce, with
many of the courts which have in terms rejected the "negligence" test agreeing, nevertheless, that the insurer's negligence is a relevant consideration in determining whether or not
it exercised the requisite good faith.'" Id. at 331, 236 Aid at 272. See Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1140-42 (1954).
14. Keeton, supra note 1, at 510.
15. See notes 27-38 infra and accompanying text.
16. Keeton, supra note 1, at 516.
17. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
18. Normally, the judgment obtained by the injured party against the insured will have
to be proven.
19. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 280 Ala. 343, 194 So. 2d 505 (1966);
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damage awards measured by the "excess judgment.
"It is . . . held that
since the insurer has reserved control over the litigation and settlement it is
liable for the entire amount of a judgment against the insured, including any
portion in excess of the policy limits .... ,,21 The primary reason for imposing liability for the entire excess judgment relates to the insurance company's power to control22settlement negotiations, and possibly "adversely affect
the insured's interests."
Although willingness to protect the citizen from unscrupulous insurance practices is admirable, 23 the decisions allowing recovery of the entire excess judgment have resulted in several inconsistencies. Conflicts have arisen concerning
the theory of recovery (in contract or in tort), 24 the necessity of proof of actual
damages, and the effect of the insured's economic status 2 on actual damages.
American Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Shook, 247 Ark. 1082, 449 S.W.2d 402 (1970); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., S0 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Bashor v. Northland Ins. Co., 29 Colo. App. 81, 480 P.2d 864 (1970), aff'd, 494 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1972);
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 177 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d 809, aff'd, 223 Ga.
789, 158 S.E.2d 243 (1967). "The normal recovery, where the insurer's actionable bad faith
or negligence is established and an excess judgment is recovered, is the amount for which the
insured becomes charged in excess of his policy coverage." Couch, supra note 11, § 51:27.
20. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 448, 285 N.E.2d 849, 861, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601, 618-19 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973) (dissenting opinion). "Regardless of the insured's financial responsibility most courts automatically adopt the excess
judgment as the measure of damages in the insured's contract action." Id. at 448, 285
N.E.2d at 861, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 618-19. See, e.g., cases cited note 63 infra.
21. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 657, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
"[S)ince a liability insurer has absolute control over any negotiations for settlement or
compromise of claims against the insured ... it may be liable to answer for the entire
amount of a judgment-even in excess of the policy limits ....
" Appleman, supra note
3, § 4713, at 578. The control over settlements stems from a clause in the insurance policy. An
example of such a clause is as follows: "With respect to such insurance as is afforded by
this policy . . . the company shall . . . make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient." E. Patterson & W. Young, Cases on Insurance 698
(4th ed. 1961).
22. Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962). "The interests of the insured and insurer often conflict. A settlement within the limits of the policy
coverage is usually advantageous for the insured, for then he avoids all risk of personal
liability for a judgment in excess of the policy limits. On the other hand, rather than consent to a settlement which would require the payment of substantially the entire amount
of its coverage, the insurance company would generally prefer to proceed to trial and seek
to avoid liability; should it lose, it may not be liable for much more than It would have
had to pay in settlement." 297 F.2d at 630. See Couch, supra note 11, at § 51:3.
23. In particular, courts do not wish "'to impair the usefulness of insurance for the
poor man.'" Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 506, 223 A.2d 8, 10 (1966)
(quoting Note, 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 726, 728 (1966)). See also Ammerman v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 22 Utah 2d 187, 190, 450 P.2d 460, 462 (1969). But see Harris v. Standard Accident
& Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627, 633 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962).
24. See text accompanying notes 27-38 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 39-67 infra.

EXCESS JUDGMENT AWARDS
B.

Controversies

1. Contract versus Tort Theories
As previously mentioned, 2 6 the confusion stems from the fact that while a
vast majority of jurisdictions employ the "bad faith" test of liability,- individual courts impose the good faith standard as an implied covenant of the insurance contractns whereas still others impose it as a fiduciary duty owed the
insured by the insurer.29 Consequently, bad faith is a breach of contract in the
former jurisdictions30 and a tortious injury in the latter.31
The importance of the alternative classification is twofold: it directly affects
the type of damages recoverable, and, depending upon the financial status of
the insured, it indirectly can affect the availability of the cause of action itself.
Moreover, while the same type of evidence and proof of injury is required in all
jurisdictions, the recovery of punitive damages,3 2 costs, attorneys' feesm and
damages for mental distress can be significantly affected. 34 However, the basic
26. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
27. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Grundy v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky.
1968) ; Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 453, 160 N.E. 911, 912
(1928).
29. See, e.g., Fetter Livestock Co. v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 257 F.
Supp. 4, 10, 11 (D. Mont. 1966); Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222, 233
(ND. Tex. 1963), modified, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965); Gedeon v. State Farm MuL
Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 59, 188 A.2d 320, 322 (1963).
30. Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 508, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (1966). "We
believe that... recent case law, employing contractual terms for the obligation of the
insurer to represent in good faith the rights of the insured, indicates that a breach of such
an obligation constitutes a breach of the insurance contract ... ." Id. at 503, 223 A.2d at
10; see, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967); Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Ky.
1968); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 436-37, 285 N.E.2d 849, 853-54,
334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607-09 (1972), cert. denied, 410 US. 931 (1973).
31. See, e.g, Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 565 (K.C. CL App. 1965);
Clark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 457 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970). Of
course, those jurisdictions applying the "negligence test" of liability assume the cause of
action is in tort. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 487, 56
A.2d 57, 60 (1947); Diunas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co, 92 N.H. 140, 141, 26 A.2d
361, 362 (1942); accord, Knudsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 26 Conn. Supp. 325,
222 A.2d 811 (New Haven C.P. 1966).
32. Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972). "[T]he theory would
create a question ... of an allowance of punitive damages." Id. at 80 n.13. See notes 49-57
infra and accompanying text.
33. See Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 373-74, 228 S.W.2d 750, 75S-56

(1950). See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1178-79 (1954).
34. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 18-19 (1967). The court in Crisci acknowledged the reluctance of courts to award

damages for mental suffering in a contract action. "Recovery of damages for mental suffering in the instant case does not mean that in every case of breach of contract the injured
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recovery for the financial injury incurred by the solvent insured, due to the
excess judgment, is not affected by classifying the action as contractual or tortious. 36 The contract rule states that "[w]here a right of action for breach
exists, compensatory damages will be given for the net amount of the losses
caused ...by the defendant's breach .... ,,37
In a tort action "I[c] ompensatory
damages' are the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or
88
restitution for harm sustained by him."

2. Actual Damages and the Insolvent Insured
When the plaintiff-insured is either insolvent, semi-insolvent, or bankrupt,
the classification of the action as tortious or contractual indirectly affects the
right to bring any action. For example, if the plaintiff is insolvent, he will not
incur actual damage since, in all likelihood, he cannot pay the excess judgment.39 Unable to prove possible out-of-pocket damages, the insured's cause of
action is partially, if not totally, eliminated. One possible method of avoiding
this result is to classify the excess judgment as a punitive damages award. However, as will be shown, 40 this alternative is repugnant to a contract action.
As might be expected, the argument that the insolvent insured is not injured
by the excess judgment is asserted repeatedly by the insurance industry in an
effort to avoid liability. 41 The argument has met with success on at least two
party may recover such damages. Here the breach also constitutes a tort." Id. at 434, 426
P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Additionally, there are problems concerning the applicable
statute of limitations and the possibility of subrogation or assignment. For a discussion of
the effect of classifying the cause of action as tort or contract on the running of applicable
statutes of limitation see Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1182-83 (1954). Problems concerning the assignability of the cause of
action are discussed in Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 510-12, 223 A.2d 8,
12-13 (1966).
35. For the purposes of this Note, a solvent insured is one whose total assets are sufficient to enable him to pay the entire excess judgment; an insolvent insured cannot be
forced to pay any part of the excess judgment, and semi-solvents can be forced to pay a
part of, but not all of, the excess judgment.
36. Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted):
"Whether the theory of the plaintiff's action be in contract or in tort, the rule of actual or
compensatory damages would appear to be the same . . . ." See Ruzanoff v. Retailers
Credit Ass'n, 97 Cal. App. 682, 276 P. 156 (3d Dist. 1929). See generally Rutherford v.
Standard Eng'r Corp., 88 Cal. App. 2d 554, 199 P.2d 354 (1st Dist. 1948).
37. Restatement of Contracts § 329 (1932) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Cottle v.
Gallup, 432 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1970); General Ins. Co. of America v. Hercules Constr. Co.,
385 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1967).
38. Restatement of Torts § 903 (1939) (emphasis added); see Ohio Oil Co. v. Elliott,
254 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1958); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954);
McCurdy v. Union Pac. R.R., 68 Wash. 2d 457, 413 P.2d 617 (1966).
39. See Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1972); Harris
v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843
(1962).
40. See notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Peterson v. Allcity Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972); Bourget v. Gov-

1973]

EXCESS JUDGMENT AWARDS

occasions. In Harris v. Standard Accident & Insurance Co. 4 2 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals denied the recovery of any excess judgment to plaintiffs suing
in place of the insolvent insured. 43 The insureds in Harris were insolvent both
before and after the excess judgment, and were adjudicated bankrupt subsequent to incurring liability for the excess judgment. 44
In Bourget v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,4 the insured was deceased. In denying any excess judgment, the court stated:
There could scarcely be a case where the insured's lack of interest in avoiding a
judgment exceeding the policy limits was as clear as this one. Thompson [the insured] had no assets at all except his car. The insurance proceeds on this were completely consumed by claims to which Connecticut gave priority over Bourget's . . . .
The Bourget holding essentially followed the reasoning of then Chief Judge
Lumbard in Harris:
The purpose of tort damages is to compensate an injured person for a loss suffered
and only for that. The law attempts to put the plaintiff in a position as nearly as
possi'ble equivalent to his position before the tort. Recovery is permitted not in order
to penalize 47the tortfeasor, but only to give damages "precisely commensurate with
the injury."
If the viewpoint espoused by the insurance industry and accepted by the Second
Circuit is correct, the insolvent insured cannot recover the excess judgment as

compensatory damages.48

As previously noted, the excess judgment can be classified alternatively as
eminent Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1972); Harris v. Standard Accident &
Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 843 (1962); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.YS.2d 601 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
42. 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 843 (1962).
43. In Harris the action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy against the bankrupt
insured's insurer. 297 F.2d at 628. In Bourget the action was brought by the insured third
party under a Connecticut statute which gave the injured third party "'a right of action
against the insurer to the same extent that the (insured] . . . could have enforced his
claim against the insurer .

. . .'"

456 F.2d at 283 n.1.

44. 297 F.2d at 629. The court relied heavily on the insureds being insolvent "before"
the incurrence of the excess judgment to distinguish the holding in Brown v. Guarantee Ins.
Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957). 297 F.2d at 632. Brown was "[tlhe
only case in which the insured went through bankruptcy and thus was discharged from
the necessity of future payments, as were the (insureds] in [Harris] . .. ." Id. In Brown
the insured was forced to go into bankruptcy because of the excess judgment liability.
Consequently, it was held that the complaint in Brown "sufficiently stated a cause of action
in favor of the insured when he filed his bankruptcy petition." 155 Cal. App. 2d at 688,
319 P.2d at 77.
45. 456 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 285 (footnote and citations omitted).
47. 297 F.2d at 631-32 (footnotes omitted). Although then Chief Judge Friendly in
Bourget considered the action to be in contract, for the purposes of compensatory damages,
the distinction is slight. See notes 35-43 supra and accompanying text.
48. 297 F.2d at 631-32.
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punitive damages.49 This appears especially attractive when the plaintiff insured is insolvent, since out-of-pocket damages do not exist.5 0 While the theory

underlying punitive damages 5' is in accord with the purpose of the excess judgment suit (protecting the insureds by penalizing the insurers for unscrupulous
or reckless practices),52 normally punitive damages are not recoverable in a
contract action.5 3 However, courts have awarded punitive damages on occa-

sion when the breach has been accompanied by an intentional wrong or gross
negligence.54 Therefore, in those jurisdictions that find a good faith covenant
implied in the insurance contract, an insured seeking to recover the excess
judgment as punitive damages would be required to prove "an extraordinary

showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out [the] contract."53
Conversely, in jurisdictions which classify the cause of action as one in tort,
punitive damages are more readily recoverable. However, even in these jurisdictions, the insured has a heavy burden of proof."
Classifying the damages awarded to the insolvent insured as "punitive" raises
further difficulties in light of the proposition, supported by numerous author49. At least one court has classified the recovery of the excess judgment as "punitive
[in] nature." Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437, 285 N.E.2d 849,
854, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-09 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
50. "Damages are punitive when they are assessed by way of punishment to the wrongdoer or example to others and not as the money equivalent of harm done." Restatement of
Contracts § 342, comment a at 561 (1932).
51. Generally it is held that punitive damages involve "a blending of the general Interest of society with those peculiar to the aggrieved party." South Texas Coaches v.
Eastland, 101 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); accord, Lampert v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 372 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1967). "[E]xemplary or punitive damages are said to be
awarded, not as compensation but as 'smart money,' as punishment to the wrongdoer and
as a deterrent, warning or example to defendant .

. . ."

Bucher v. Drause, 200 F.2d 576,

587 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); accord, Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F.
Supp. 36, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846
(1955); Fisher v. Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965). See generally C. McCormick, Damages 275-78 (1935).
52. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
53. Restatement of Contracts § 342 (1932). See, e.g., PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Wood
v. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering Sys. Co., 409 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1968); King v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 273 N.C. 396, 159 S.E.2d 891 (1968); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger &
Neville, Inc. v. Hayden PubL Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 766, 306 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1st Dep't 1969)
(mem.), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 34, 281 N.E.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875
(1972).
54. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970); Griffith v. Shamrock
Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957) ; Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968).
55. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601, 609 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
56. See Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d
210 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App. Div. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d
288 (3d Dep't 1954). See generally Comment, Exemplary Damages Awarded for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 877 (1958).

19731

EXCESS JUDGMENT AWARDS

ities, that a claim for punitive damages alone is insufficient to support a cause
of action. In other words, actual injury, sufficient to justify awarding compensatory damages, must be proven before punitive damages can be considered. 5
In this light, the possibility of recovery based solely on punitive damages is
jeopardized.
3.

The Prepayment Rule

Parallel to the position that actual damages are required before punitive
damages can be awarded, a number of jurisdictions require, as a prerequisite to
bringing the cause of action against the insurer for the excess judgment, either
the prepayment of the judgment or proof of the ability of the insured to pay
the judgment eventually.58 The leading case setting forth the "prepayment
rule" is Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,80 wherein Justice Page,
writing for a unanimous court, held that the right to sue for the excess judgment
accrues only when the plaintiff has suffered an actual injury. "The possibility
of injury is not injury itself .... In the case before us the injury will remain
merely possible and conjectural until the plaintiff has paid the excess judgment
.. .or at least until his financial status is such that the excess judgment is
sure to be collected .. .."60 Although Dumas involved a solvent, possibly
wealthy insured, 61 the ramifications of the holding dearly affect insolvent
insureds. Since excess judgments involve thousands and usually tens of thousands
of dollars, 62 the doors of the courts would be closed to those unable to expend
the large sums necessary to meet the excess liability.
To protect the interests of the insolvent insured, recent cases have rejected
57. See Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 App. Div. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d
Dep't 1954). "The claim for punitive damages is not a separate cause of action; it merely
constitutes 'an element of the single total claim for damages . . . .'" Knibbs v. Wagner, 14
App. Div. 2d 987, 222 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (4th Dep't 1961) (mem.) (citation omitted). But
d. Kent v. Buffalo, 61 Misc. 2d 142, 304 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 818, 277 N.E.2d 669, 327 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1971) (libel action).
58. Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1942); see
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 US. 591
(1939). But see 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 726, 727-28 & nn.4-S (1966) (suggesting that the
Dumas prepayment rule is based on a misreading of State Auto. Mut. Ins. v. York). See
also Norwood v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 595, 284 N.W. 785 (1939), overruled in Lange
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 290 Minn. 61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971).
59. 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1942).
60. Id. at 141, 26 A.2d at 362 (citations omitted).
61. The insured was a physician. After the adverse ruling, he simply wrote a check for
the $7,000 excess judgment and re-instituted the cause of action, eventually recovering the
entire excess judgment. See Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56
A.2d 57 (1947).
62. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1965)
($75,000 judgment); Augustin v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 283 F.2d 82
(7th Cir. 1960) ($22,500 judgment); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canale, 257
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1958) ($35,000 judgment).
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both the "actual injury" and the "prepayment rule." 03 These cases recognize
that even an insolvent insured is actually injured when a judgment against him
remains unpaid. 4 Similarly, the court in Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co. 0 listed three major reasons for abolishing the prepayment rule:
(1) such view prevents an insurer from benefiting from the impecuniousness of an
insured who has a meritorious claim but cannot first pay the judgment imposed
upon him; (2) such view negates the possibility that the insurer would be .

.

. less

responsive ... to its trust duties where the insured is able to pay the excess judgment.
Were payment the rule, an insurer with an insolvent insured could unreasonably
refuse to settle, for, at worst, it would only be liable for the amount specified by the
policy. To permit this would be to impair the usefulness of insurance for the poor
man . . . (3)

such view recognizes that the fact of entry of the judgment itself

against the insured constitutes a real damage to him because of the potential harm
to his credit rating .... 61
In short, recent decisions treat "extant, unpaid judgments as injuries in themselves, their overburden measuring the pecuniary damages." 07 Under this view,
the loss can be recovered as compensatory damages and the problems surrounding a punitive damages theory avoided.
IV. RECENT CASES
Two recent New York cases, Gordon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.08
and Peterson v. Allcity Insurance Co., 9 have taken the actual damages re70
quirement a step further.

In Gordon, the New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court which
had awarded the insolvent an excess judgment of $259,058.8771 (over twelve63. Jenkins v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 349 Mass. 699, 212 N.E.2d 464
(1965). "Despite some conflict in earlier cases, the weight of authority is that it is not
necessary for the insured to allege that he has paid or will pay a judgment in excess of the
policy limits in an action against the insurer for breach of its duty to act in good faith." Id.
at 703, 212 N.E.2d at 467 (citations and footnote omitted); accord, Gray v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 506, 223 A.2d 8, 10 (1966); Henegan v. Merchants Mut. Ins.
Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1968). See generally 27 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 726 (1966).
64. Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 286 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1961). "'Payment Is
no more a condition precedent to suit for recovery of the damage in the one case [bodily
injury] than in the other [excess judgment]."' Id. (citation omitted).
65. 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
66. Id. at 506, 223 A.2d at 10 (citations omitted) (quoting 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 726, 728
(1966)).
67. 286 F.2d at 298.
68. 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931
(1973).
69. 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. In each of the cases, the plaintiff was a party suing in place of the insured.
71. 30 N.Y.2d at 431, 285 N.E.2d at 850, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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and-a-half times the policy limit). Judge Bergan, writing for a plurality of
three,7 2 considered the action as contractual, 73 and stated that "a punitive
measure of damages is not applied routinely for breach of contract; and bad
faith requires an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure
to carry out a contract. ' 7 4 He concluded that "[nlo such remarkable showing
of bad faith is made in this record to warrant . . . imposition of liability
vastly beyond the policy limits."7 The opinion illustrates the reluctance of
courts to attach punitive damages to contract actions.70 Indeed, the insured
will have to establish an extraordinary degree of bad faith" or "the damage
for refusal to settle [will be] limited ...

by the policy coverage." 78

Chief Judge Fuld's concurring opinion rejected 79those decisions holding that
the unpaid judgment is an injury in and of itself:
There are . .. decisions in some jurisdictions which hold that an excess judgment
entered against the insured measures the damages suffered by him even though he
may be insolvent and the judgment uncollectible. I find such a rule both unreasonable
and unfair. Recovery against an insurer should not be sanctioned or upheld as
punishment or as a punitive measure. In my view, an insured is not harmed and, by
that token, suffers no damage when an uncollectible judgment is entered against him.80
On the other hand, then Chief Judge Fuld specifically did reject the prepayment rule."' Essentially, he advocated a compromise solution to the controversy over actual damages. While his position does not require "prepayment," it does recognize the inequity in automatically awarding the complete
excess judgment without any proof of actual damages.
In a persuasive dissent,8 2 Judge Breitel also proposed an intermediate solution:
The situation of the insolvent, the deceased, or the bankrupt insured presents an
obvious difficulty, in contrast to the solvent insured. In many instances, measuring
the damages by the amount of the excess judgments, especially when they are as
great as in this case, incurs judicial resistance, even as against a carrier which has
been proven to be grossly negligent and callously arrogant. Nevertheless, limiting
damages to policy coverage and litigation expense, if any, incurred by an abandoned
72. Judges Scileppi and Jasen joined in Judge Bergan's opinion. Chief Judge Fuld
wrote a concurring opinion. Judges Burke and Gibson joined in Judge Breitel's dissent.
73. 30 N.Y.2d at 433, 285 N.E.2d at 851-52, 334 N.YS.2d at 605.
74. Id. at 437, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
75. Id. at 433, 285 N.E.2d at 852, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
76. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
77. The court recognized the insured's failure to pay his insurance premiums and the
insurer's good faith reliance on the advice of its counsel as mitigating Nationwide's breach.
30 N.Y.2d at 433, 285 N.E.2d at 851-52, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
78. Id. at 439, 285 N.E.2d at 855, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
79. Id. at 439, 285 N.E.2d at 856, 334 N.Y..2d at 611. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
80. 30 N.Y.2d at 439-40, 285 N.E.2d at 856, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 611 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 441, 285 N.E.2d at 856, 334 N.YS.2d at 612.
82. Id. at 441-53, 285 N.E.2d at 857-64, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 612-23.
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insured would be patently unjust. In most instances, if that were the rule, the carrier
conduct than it would have lost if it had
will not have risked more by its faithless
83
performed its obligations faithfully.

In rejecting both extremes, Judge Breitel favors a rational assessment of
damages. Thus, any award to the insolvent insured would take into account
pertinent economic factors relative to the insured's individual circumstances,
including "the age, economic status, economic prospects, skills, health, and any
other matters presently existing which would be reasonably predictive of the
insured's economic future . .

4 Judge Breitel realized this method of

. .

assessing damages would be difficult, 5 but no more so than in many other
instances of damages assessment.86 Furthermore, any difficulties encountered
are far outweighed by the fact
that "such a rational and considered assessment
pragmatic."'8 7

is both fair and
Judge Breitel also rejected the prepayment rule, stating:

[T]he insured or his representative has the burden of persuasion on damages. He

satisfies the burden, prima fade, by proving the amount of the excess tort judgment.
The insurer may always show that in fact the insured was invulnerable or immune to
the judgment, in whole or in part, because of his economic circumstances, or

bankruptcy. The insured or his representative may then controvert the insurer's
evidence. 88
In essence, the dissent would extend the right to bring the cause of action once
the excess judgment has been incurred but would reserve to the insurer the right
to prove that the insured was invulnerable to the judgment.
Shortly after Gordon, the Second Circuit decided Peterson v. Allcity Insurance Co.8 This latter action, involving a $70,000 excess judgment, was
brought by the assignee of a solvent, though financially depressed, insured. 0
In the majority opinion, Judge Mulligan, applying New York law, upheld
the recovery of the entire excess judgment.0 ' The opinion acknowledged that
under the reasoning of Judge Fuld and Breitel in Gordon, "the plaintiff insured
(or his representative or assignee) should only be entitled to recover to the
extent that he has been or, in the reasonably forseeable future, will be damaged
by the outstanding judgment.192 Although Judge Mulligan regarded "such a
rule as sensible," 93 he distinguished it, noting that Judge Breitel's "realistic
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 450, 285 N.E.2d at 862, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
Id. at 451, 285 N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
Id.

86. Judge Breitel drew the analogy to the assessments "required when persons have
been permanently injured or have been killed and the damage to their prospects or to
their dependents is to be assessed ....

."

Id., 285 N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 621.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 452, 285 N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
89.
90.
91.

472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 81.

92. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 80.
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approach for the semi-solvent insured is limited to the extreme case where the
magnitude of the excess judgment is so great as to make unjust, the imposition
of liability to its full amount."9 4 Accordingly, he compared the policy limits,

the excess judgments, and the economic status of the insured involved in
Gordon and Peterson,95 and concluded that, on the facts of the case, the verdict
in Peterson was not "extreme or punitive."98
Judge Moore, dissenting, pointed out the inherent weaknesses in the majority's
interpretation of Gordon:
Such an approach establishes a standard rife with arbitrary and inconsistent results,
and one not susceptible of even-handed application. ..The better rule, dearly,
is to focus not on the magnitude of the excess judgment in ratio-to the policy of
coverage, but rather, on the amount of actual harm occasioned on the semi-solvent
insured-and then impose on the bad faith insurer the amount of damage suffered by
the insured. 97
The dissent, endorsing the reasoning of Judges Fuld and Breitel in Gordon, felt
that the insured in Peterson was being awarded an undeserved windfall-a result
cautioned against in prior Second Circuit cases.98
Although Gordon and Peterson both ostensibly applied the law of New York,
they are clearly in conflict as to the theory of the cause of action.9 9 the punitive
damage award,100 and the necessity of actual damages. 01' Indeed, the difficulty
encountered by the courts reflects the continuing controversy and confusion
surrounding excess judgment suits.
V. PROPOSAL
As has been seen, the courts initially invoked the excess judgment award as
a deterrent to the insurer's ability to control and manipulate the settlement
procedure to the detriment of the insured. In contrast, the more recent decisions
in Gordon and Peterson demonstrate the courts' inclination to eliminate the
94. Id. (citation omitted). However, this interpretation ignores Judge Breitel's further
comment that a realistic assessment of damages should be given "in cases involving other
than a solvent insured," not just in cases involving judgments of a great magnitude. 30
N.Y.2d at 451, 28S N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (dissenting opinion).
95. 472 F.2d at 80.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 83.
98. Id. at 81.
99. Judges Bergan and Mulligan regarded the action as contractual. Chief Judge Fuld
and Judge Bretel regarded the action as tortious. Judge Moore relied heavily on the discussions of Judge Brietel and Chief Judge Fuld, apparently regarding the action as tortious.
100. Judge Bergan regarded the excess judgment as punitive. 30 N.Y.2d at 437, 285
N.E2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 608. Chief Judge Fuld specifically rejected the proposition
that the excess judgment could "be sanctioned or upheld as punishment or as a punitive
measure." Id. at 440, 285 N.E2d at 856, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
101. Compare Judge Mulligan's discussion of the damages award in Peterson, 472 F.2d
at 79-81, with Judge Moore's dissenting opinion, id. at 81-84. See notes 79-87 supra and
accompanying text.
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excess judgment award when it appears that the insurer will be forced to
provide a "windfall" for the insolvent or semi-insolvent insured. Confronted
with these conflicting considerations, the courts have been unable to find
an equitable solution. Indeed, both Peterson and10 2Gordon continue the "all
or nothing" approach to the excess judgment award.
The major hindrance to a compromise position such as advocated by Judge
Breitel in Gordon'0 3 is the inability of the courts to restrict the liability of the
insured to the injured third party. As noted in Gordon, "[t]his follows from the
circumstance that as each increment of damage is paid [to the insured], it
becomes subject to the tort creditor's claim, with an excess, albeit reduced,
judgment liability still outstanding."' 0 4 Thus, if the insolvent insured is forced
to accept something less than the entire excess judgment in his action against
the insurer, he will remain indebted to the injured party until he acquires
sufficient funds to retire the debt or until he elects the embarrassing remedy
of bankruptcy. 10 5
Since the courts are faced with divergent theories and considerations, it is
time for legislative resolution of this matter. A statutory cause of action should
encompass liability for an insurer's bad faith or negligent failure to settle claims,
providing for both actual and punitive damages. Thus, if the insurer acted in
bad faith or negligently, the insured could recover all actual damages. Moreover,
if the insurer acted in a grossly negligent manner or with a malicious intent,
the insured, at the discretion of the court, could recover punitive damages.
Finally, if the plaintiff is any party other than the insured or if the insured is
suing with the consent of a third party, any outstanding judgment owing to
such party by the insured would be completely fulfilled by the resulting recovery.
The actual damages award would be measured in a manner similar to that
delineated in Judge Breitel's dissent in Gordon.106 Factors such as the insured's
age, assets, and potential income, as well as sums already paid the injured party
would be significant determinants. Punitive damages would be available only
where a flagrant and7 intentional or grossly negligent disregard of the insured's
0
interests is proved.'
It is submitted that all parties affected would benefit from the certainty
provided by such a statutory cause of action. The assurance that any liability
102. The party suing in place of the sernisolvcnt insured in Peterson received the entire
$70,000 excess judgment. The party suing in place of the insolvent insured In Gordon received no part of the $259,058.87 excess judgment.
103. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
104. 30 N.Y.2d at 450, 285 NE.2d at 862, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (dissenting opinion).
105. "[T]he submission to bankruptcy to avoid the excess judgment may be a significant loss for those who are sensitive or for those who have a reasonable likelihood of
ever requiring credit." Id. at 450-51, 285 N.E.2d at 862, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (Breltel,
J., dissenting). See also Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1181 & n.110 (1954).
106. 30 N.Y.2d at 450-52, 285 N.E.2d at 862-63, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620-22. See text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
107. To avoid possible jury prejudice against the insurer, it could be recommended that
such a determination be left to the judge as a matter of law.
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incurred in excess of the policy limits could be satisfied with a recovery under
the statute is beneficial to the insured. Similarly, the insurance industry benefits
since recovery under the statutory cause of action would be limited, in a majority
of cases, to the actual damages proved. Injured third parties also benefit indirectly, 08 since the insolvents would be more likely to litigate or assign their
claims as a means of extinguishing outstanding liability.
Joseph R. Sinone
108. It must be emphasized that the primary purpose of the proposed statute is
provide an alternative to the inequities that flow from the award of the excess judgment
a measure of the insured's damages. Any benefit accruing to the injured third party can
considered incidental. "[I]f extensions of liability insurance coverage are to be provided

to
as
be
by

agreement or legislation for the purpose of benefiting claimants, it is arguable that the increased cost of insurance should be applied toward higher contract limits, rather than
toward disregarding limits when a settlement offer is declined." Keeton, Liability Insurance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136, 1177 (1954) (footnote omitted).

